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INTRODUCTION

Over the last century, scientific progress in the field of biotechnology' has grown exponentially. The ability to clone humans, once
the subject of science fiction literature, 2 is now a "raelity." On December 28, 2002, Raelian leader Claude Vorilhon 3 announced that his
company, Clonaid, cloned the first human, a female child named
"Eve."' 4 The harsh criticism, skepticism, and fear 5 that followed the
I

Biotechnology is "applied biological science (as the synthesis of enzymes, genes,

and antibodies for medical use)." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 219

(Philip Babcock Gove et al. eds., 3d ed. 1986). The definition of the word in common
usage may be broader. E. Vermeersch & Tom Claes, Biotechnology, Patents and Morality:
Towards a Consensus, at http://www.flwi.ugent.be/philosophy/claes/research/patents.htm
("[T]he way it is used nowadays also covers diverse practices in an array of fields[, including] molecular biology and genetics (e.g. manipulation of DNA in genetic engineering),
biomedical science (e.g. in vitro fertilisation), agriculture (e.g. in vitro propagation or cloning of plants), [and] medical science (e.g. recombinant vaccines).").
2
See, e.g., ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAvE NEW WORLD (1932). For a modern analysis of the
ethical issues presented in Brave New World, see Bernard Gert, Thinking About Huxley's Brave
New World: Was It Wrong To Create a Genetic HierarchicalSociety? Is It Wrong 7o Prevent One?, in
ETHICS AND LAW IN BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH 107 (Cosimo Marco Mazzoni ed., 2002).

3 Mr. Vorilhon "claims to be a direct descendant of extraterrestrials who created
human life on Earth through genetic engineering." Raelian Leader: Cloning First Step to
Immortality, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/HEALTH/12/28/human.cloning/index.html
(Dec. 29, 2002).
4 Id.
5 See, e.g., Paul Lesko & Kevin Buckley, Attack of the Clones... and the Issues of Clones, 3
COLUM. SC!. & TECH. L. REv. 1, 1 (2002) (noting that Advanced Cell Technology's cloning
of a human embryo in November 2001 caused "a worldwide uproar"); Philip M. Boffey,
Fearingthe Worst Should Anyone Produce a ClonedBaby, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, §4, at 10 ("But
with several renegade groups supposedly racing to produce the first cloned baby, it is almost inevitable that sooner or later someone will succeed. It's time to start preparing ourselves mentally for that eventuality."); Bill McKibben, A Threat to Our Coherent Human
Future, WASH. POST,Jan. 6, 2003, at A15 (claiming that "[t]he threat posed by such work to
the human species and to our societies is far greater even than the possibility that Rael or
his competitors may have damaged the particular children they set out to clone"); Vatican
Slams "Brutal" Clone Claim, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/HEALTH/12/28/cloning.vati
can/index.html (Dec. 28, 2002) (quoting the Vatican as stating that the Raelians are of a
"'brutal mentality'" lacking "'ethical consideration"'). But see Richard Cohen, Unsettling,
Maybe, but Not Unethical, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2003, at A19 ("We cannot permit either our
repugnance for a weird cult or our fear of the different to produce a retreat from a knowl-
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Raelian announcement-which appears to be "'an elaborate
hoax' "6 -epitomizes the worldwide concern that biotechnology
generates.
Biotechnology is immensely important to the economies of both
the United States and Europe. 7 Genetics companies have obtained
thousands of patents for products in the United States since 1980, and
the industry now employs well more than 60,000 people.8 Patents provide the "prerequisite" for growth in new industries and foster the
"birth and growth of many new companies."9 Yet despite these positive effects on national economies, not everyone has welcomed biotechnology because many of its achievements-such as the ability to
clone humans-are controversial.
Scholars have questioned what role, if any, patent law t0 should
play in protecting inventions that can generate a wave of controversy." If patent law is to remain relevant in this era of unprecedented biotechnological advancement, the question arises as to
whether patent examiners or courts should be able to deny a patent
application or invalidate patents they deem immoral. The European
Union has answered this question in the affirmative by enacting Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions
(the "Biotech Directive"). 12 In contrast, United States courts have not
recently invalidated patents on moral grounds, 13 although the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) still claims to consider the moral utility
of potential patents.1 4 Increasing concern about human cloning and
edge that is almost certain to be used anyway and that-just maybe-could save or enrich
lives.").
6 Kenneth Chang, Saying That Hoax Is Possible, Journalist Leaves Cloning Tests, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2003, at A12.
7

See PHILIP W. GRUBB, PATENTS FOR CHEMICALS, PHARMACEUTICALS AND BIOTECHNOL-

OGY FUNDAMENTALS

OF GLOBAL LAW, PRACTICE AND STRATEGY 252 (3d ed. 1999).

8 See Harriet M. Strimpel, Comments on the Proceedingsof the Conference on Biotechnology,
Patents and Morality, in BIOTECHNOLOGY, PATENTS AND MORALITY 283, 287 (Sigrid Sterckx
ed., 1997).
9

Id. at 289.

10 Patent protection in the United States derives from Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution: "The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Patent protection in
Europe is derived from international agreements. See infta Part I.C.
I1 See, e.g., Lesko & Buckley, supra note 5, at 31-39.
12 See Eur. Parl. Directive 98/44/EC on the Legal Protection of Biological Inventions,
1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/1-213/l_2131
9980730en00130021.pdf [hereinafter Biotech Directive].
'3
SeeJuicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
14
See, e.g., Media Advisory, Patent and Trademark Office, Facts on Patenting Life
Forms Having a Relationship to Humans (Apr. 1, 1998), at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offi
ces/com/speeches/98-06.htm ("It is the position of the PTO that [certain] inventions...
could . . . not be patentable because, among other things, they would fail to meet the
public policy and morality aspects of the utility requirement.").

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:685

stem cell research in the United States and abroad has provoked debate over what constitutes patentable subject matter and whether patent examiners or courts should make ethical considerations when
determining whether to deny or invalidate a patent. 15 Should the
United States follow the controversial morality provisions of the Biotech Directive by reviving its own means of invalidating patents
deemed immoral? Criticism of the Biotech Directive and European
Patent Convention's morality provisions shed light on this issue.
This Note addresses the recent criticism of the morality provisions of the European Patent Convention (EPC) and Biotech Directive and argues that moral and ethical concerns should not enter into
consideration in determining the usefulness of an invention in the
United States. Part I provides background on the status of moral and
ethical considerations in the patent systems of the United States and
Europe. This Part specifically attends to the Biotech Directive's new
role and the likely effect of its morality provisions. Part II focuses on
recent criticism of the EPC and Biotech Directive morality provisions.
Part III applies this criticism to the moral utility doctrine and concludes that courts and patent examiners should ask only whether a particular invention may be useful to the public, not whether the public
should use such an invention.
I
PATENT PROTECTION AND MORALITY IN THE
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE

A.

Economic Advantages of the Patent System

The patenting and drug approval process in the United States is
not cheap. Drug manufacturers claim that it costs $500 million and
takes twelve to fourteen years to patent a new drug. 16 On average,
only one in ten drugs makes it to market. 17 Research in biotechnology and the patenting of inventions in the United States is a lengthy
process involving expensive, high-risk investments backed by many expectations about patent laws and the patenting process.
Those who patent biotechnological inventions also know that adequate patent protection is extremely important. Patents protect inventors by awarding them a limited-term monopoly to prevent others
from commercially benefiting from the invention.1 8 In return for this
15

See, e.g., 148 CONG. Rac.

S5520-25

(daily ed. June 13, 2002) (statement of Sen.

Hatch).
David Noonan, Why Drugs Cost So Much, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 2000, at 22, 26.
Id.
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, EUROPEAN PATENTS 3, 11, at http://www.european-pat
ent-office.org/epo/pubs/brochure/europat/pdf/europate.pdf [hereinafter EUROPEAN
PATENTS]. Several arguments support patent protection, including the "ownership," "re16
17
18

PROTECTING SOCIETY

2004]

689

protection, the inventor must fully disclose the invention. 19 Once
published, patent applications and grants are a "prime source" of information for scientists 2 0-perhaps
"lay[ing] the groundwork for a
chain reaction of inventive ideas." 2 1 This so-called patent-for-disclosure bargain creates incentives to invest in research and development 22 while encouraging inventors to develop their inventions for
23
commercial purposes.
The limited-term monopoly further allows inventors not only to
recoup development costs, but also to generate a fair return on their
investment. 24 If the patented invention becomes profitable and acceptable to the public, the period of patent protection may afford the
inventor an opportunity to build a business or entire industry that
stimulates both the national and international economies. 25 Effective
patent protection encourages research and development and fosters
technological innovation, competition and overall economic growth
as well:

26

Experience gained in all industrial nations shows that technological
progress and successful economic development go hand in hand
with strong patent protection and a smoothly functioning patent system. In the history of industrial societies there is no instance of a
country having undergone favourable economic and technological
27
development in the absence of adequate patent protection.
Because adequate patent protection is crucial to biotechnological development, 28 patent laws themselves must be sound enough to protect
the inventor's expectations and provide the incentive to seek a patent,
as an inventor is not required to patent any invention.
ward," "incentive," and "disclosure" theories. These theories are not mutually exclusive,
but supplement each other. PATENT LAW AND EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION 5-6 (1991)
[hereinafter EUROPEAN PATENT LAw]. The "ownership theory" assumes that any invention
naturally belongs to the person who invented it; therefore, any use of the invention without the inventor's consent is "intellectual theft." Id. at 5. The "reward theory," based on
notions of fairness, assumes that every service that increases technology deserves to be
rewarded. Id. The "incentive theory" assumes that inventions will be made only if there is
incentive, in the form of a limited-term monopoly to generate an adequate return, to invest in inventions. Id. The "disclosure theory" "presupposes that the inventor makes his
new technical knowledge available to the public." Id. at 6.
19
EUROPEAN PATENTS, supra note 18, at 3.
20
Id.
21
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATENTS: SPUR TO AMERICAN PROGRESS 5 (1969) [hereinafter AMERICAN PATENTS]
22
See EUROPEAN PATENTS,
23
24
25
26
27
28
EDGE

supra note 18, at 3.
supra note 21, at 5.
supra note 18, at 5.
supra note 21, at 6.
supra note 18, at 5.
EUROPEAN PATENT LAw, supra note 18, at 6 (emphasis added).
But see generally VANDANA SHIVA, BIoPIRAcY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWL(1997) (arguing that the patent system exploits and colonizes non-Western society).
See AMERICAN PATENTS,
See EUROPEAN PATENTS,
See AMERICAN PATENTS,
See EUROPEAN PATENTS,
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Status of the Moral Utility Doctrine in the United States

For an invention to be patentable subject matter in the United
States, it must be new and useful, 29 novel 30 and nonobvious. 3 1 The
Supreme Court in Brenner v. Manson noted that to be "useful" an invention must provide a benefit to the public. 3 2 The Revised Interim
Utility Guidelines Training Materials of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office require that the application must show specific,
substantial, and credible utility.33 The Guidelines are silent, however,
as to whether an invention must have moral utility.
1.

Federal Courts'DecreasedReliance on the Moral Utility Doctrine

In Lowell v. Lewis, Justice Story stated that for an invention to be
"useful," it cannot conflict with the "sound morals of society."3 4
This
requirement is referred to as the moral utility doctrine. Throughout
the twentieth century, courts invalidated patents for items, such as
29
30

See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001).
Id. § 102.
31
Id. § 103.
32 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) ("The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit
derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility.").
33

See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REVISED INTERIM UTILITY GUIDELINES TRAIN-

MATERIALS 3, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/utility.pdf (last visited Jan. 12,
2004).
34 15 F. Cas 1018, 1019 (C.C. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568). Justice Story states:
All that the law requires is, that the invention should not be frivolous or
injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society. The
word "useful," therefore, is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to
mischievous or immoral. For instance, a new invention to poison people,
or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private assassination, is not a patentable invention.
Id.
The question of how narrowly one should interpret Justice Story's formulation is unclear. In Brenner v. Manson, Justice Fortas noted:
Narrowly read, it does no more than compel us to decide whether the invention in question is "frivolous and insignificant"-a query no easier of
application than the one built into the statute. Read more broadly, so as to
allow the patenting of any invention not positively harmful to society, it
places such a special meaning on the word "useful" that we cannot accept it
in the absence of evidence that Congress so intended. There are, after all,
many things in this world which may not be considered "useful" but which,
nevertheless are totally without a capacity for harm.
383 U.S. at 533.
Some scholars question whether the "usefulness" requirement should be a prerequiING

site to patentability. See WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAw: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 33 (1973) ("Usefulness is a proper precondition for reward, but not

for patentability. The market performs more reliably than patent examiners in determining
usefulness in a price-oriented patent system."). Bowman also argues that the market is a
better judge of usefulness than courts or the PTO. Id. at 47 ("Skepticism about either the
courts' or the Patent Office's taking on the task of predicting usefulness or attempting to
judge and reward relative merit is reinforced by the judgment that the market, imperfect
as it is, is a better assessor of usefulness.").
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gambling machines, on the ground that they were immoral..3 5 Recently, however, courts have not broadly applied the moral utility doctrine in the United States to reject patent applications or invalidate
existing patents.3 6 In Juicy w~lip, Inc. v. OrangeBang, Inc., the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the validity of a patent that
"[has] the capacity to fool some members of the public.... through
37
imitation in a manner that is designed to increase product sales.
The Juicy Wip court noted that the rule which would mandate invalidating patents because one can use the item for deceptive or illegal
purposes is no longer good law. 3 8 In fact, most patent attorneys in the
United States believe that the "American view" is that "morality should
...

have nothing to do with patents.

'39

The moral utility doctrine is not completely dead, though. Although courts do not apply the doctrine in their decisions, they still
refer to Justice Story's classic formulation of utility. For example, the
court in Geneva Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. GlaxosmithklinePLC noted that a
patent possesses utility "'if it will operate to perform the functions and
secure the results intended, and its use is not contrary to law, moral
principles, or public policy.' "40 Thus, courts will not necessarily apply
the moral utility doctrine. 4 1 Further, some commentators are divided
as to its place in patent law. Professor Peter Rosenberg notes that
"[w] hat is immoral varies from generation to generation ....

[and]

cases denying the protection of the law on the ground of immorality

35 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in HigherLife Forms: The Patent System
and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REv. 1051, 1063 (1988) (noting that patents, such
as gambling machines, were invalidated for being immoral well into the middle of the
twentieth century).
36
SeeJuicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
37
Id. at 1368.
38 See id. at 1367 ("[Y]ears ago courts invalidated patents on gambling devices on the
ground that they were immoral but that is no longer the law." (citations omitted)).
39
Ronald Schapira, Biotechnology Patents in the United States, in BIOTECHNOLOGY, PATENTS AND MORALTY, supra note 8, at 171, 172.
40
Geneva Pharms., Inc. v. Glaxosmithkline PLC, 213 F. Supp. 2d 597, 610 (E.D. Va.
2002) (quoting Callison v. Dean, 70 F.2d 55, 58 (10th Cir. 1934) (emphasis added)).
41
CompareWhistler Corp. v. Autotronics Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1885, 1886 (N.D.
Texas 1988) (holding a patent for a radar detector, designed for the exclusive purpose of
circumventing the law, useful and noting that it is a matter for legislatures and Congress to
prohibit such devices), andJuicy Whip, Inc., 185 F.3d at 1366-68 (upholding the patent for
a device that may fool members of the public, while noting that it would defer to Congress
if it were to make the patenting of such devices illegal), with Geneva Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,
213 F. Supp. 2d at 609-10 (continuing to apply a moral standard to determinations of the
usefulness of a patent), and Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft, 945 F.2d 1546, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the usefulness requirement "has
...been interpreted to exclude inventions deemed to be immoral"), and Am. Standard
Inc. v. Pfizer Inc. 722 F. Supp. 86, 150 (D. Del. 1989) (noting that to be useful, the patent's
.purpose must not be illegal, immoral or contrary to public policy").
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are not of this generation. ''42 However, Professor Donald Chisum argues that, although narrow, moral utility as a public policy doctrine
requires that "[a] patent will be withheld only if the invention cannot
43
be used for any honest and moral purpose."
Decreased reliance on the moral utility doctrine to invalidate patents seems curious in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Diamond v. Chakrabarty that a live, human-made organism constituted
patentable subject matter.4 4 In Chakrabarty, the respondent sought to
patent a "human-made, genetically engineered bacterium ... capable
of breaking down multiple components of crude oil."'45 Noting the
significant value 4 6 and utility4 7 of such an invention, the Court failed

to address its moral utility, focusing instead on whether the invention
was "natural."48 The holding opened the door to patenting more
than just human-made bacteria, as scientists and inventors began to
patent more complex life-forms such as transgenic animals in the
United States, all in the absence of serious challenge to the morality of
49
such patents.
2.

The Patent and Trademark Office's PurportedReliance on the
Moral Utility Doctrine:Ex parte Murphy, the Newman
Application, and the University of Missouri Patent

Despite the PTO's purported reliance on the moral utility doctrine when examining patent applications, a brief review of the PTO's
decisions regarding controversial biotechnological inventions reveals
a history devoid of ethical considerations. Notably, the Patent Board
of Appeals hesitated to invalidate a patent for a gambling device in its
1976 decision Ex parte Murphy.50 The Board of Appeals noted:
"[W]hile some may consider gambling to be injurious to the public
morals and the good order of society, we cannot find any basis in [35
U.S.C. § 101] or related sections which justify a conclusion that inventions which are useful only for gambling ipso facto are void of patentable utility."5 1 The Board of Appeals opined that legislative bodies
42

PETER D.

ROSENBERG,

PATENT

LAW

BAsics

§ 8.05

(10th

ed.

2002)

(footnote

omitted).
43
DONALD S. CHISUM, 1 PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY
AND INFRINGEMENT § 4.03 (1995).

44
45

447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980).
Id. at 305.

46

Id.

47

Id. at 310.

48

See id. at 309 ("The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have

been held not patentable."). The briefs of the parties involved in the litigation, however,
did address the moral and ethical concerns associated with such inventions. See id. at
316-17.
49

See infra Part I.D.

50
51

200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801 (Bd. App. 1977).
Id. at 802.
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outside the PTO should determine whether such devices are patentable: " [W] e think this Office should not be the agency which seeks to
enforce a standard of morality with respect to gambling, by refusing,
on the ground of lack of patentable utility, to grant a patent .... "52
Twenty-two years later, in 1998, reports revealed that Stuart Newman, a cellular biologist, sought to patent a technique for producing a
half-human, half-animal species. 53 Such an invention is exactly what
biotechnology patent opponents feared, and the Newman application
process represented perhaps the closest the PTO has come to denying
a patent application for being immoral. Ironically, rather than seeking to create such an animal-human hybrid, Newman designed the
application to "reignite debate about the ethics of genetic engineering and the patenting of life forms." 5 4 The PTO denied Newman's
application because it "embrace [d]" a human being, and thus did not
constitute patentable subject matter. 55 The Newman application resulted in the issuance of a "media advisory" in which the PTO claimed
to continue to rely on Justice Story's formulation of utility. This advisory, however, failed to operate as a revival of the moral utility doctrine because the PTO's revised 2001 examiner guidelines concerning
utility make no mention of morality or public policy issues. 56 Furthermore, then-PTO commissioner Bruce Lehman stated: "'[I]f an applicant presents a scientifically plausible use for the claimed invention, it
57
will be sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement."
In the same year, the University of Missouri sought to patent a
controversial invention involving "'a method for producing a cloned
mammal." 58 The PTO granted the patent, which involved ways to
transplant a nucleus from (1) a cultured mammalian cell, (2) a mammalian embryo, (3) a mammalian fetus, or (4) an adult mammal to a
recipient mammalian oocyte to produce a cloned mammalian embryo
and, ultimately, a cloned mammal. 59 Opponents of the patent included the Center for Technology Assessment (CTA), which contended that the patent amounted to human cloning and that "[t]he
PTO has the legal authority under both national and international law
to reject patents that offend public morality or order but did not do so
Id. at 803.
See Group Faults PTO for Issuing Patent on 'Method of Producing Cloned Mammal,' 64
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYMGHTJ. 81 (2002) [hereinafter Group Faults].
54
Id. ("Newman, who opposes such patents, is allied with social activistJeremy Rifkin,
a longtime foe of intellectual property protection for biological organisms and genetic
compounds.").
55
See Patent Application Is Disallowed As 'Embracing'Human Being, 58 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHTJ. 203 (1999).
56
See Group Faults, supra note 53, at 81.
57
See id. at 81-82 (quoting Bruce Lehman, PTO Commissioner).
58
U.S. Patent No. 6,211,429 (issued Apr. 3, 2001).
52

53

59

Id.
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in the case of the Missouri patent." 60 Both the Missouri patent and
Newman application demonstrate the continuing controversy surrounding biotechnological patents. Furthermore, they demonstrate
both the federal courts' and the PTO's reluctance to revive the moral
utility doctrine in full.
C.

Patent Protection in Europe and the Morality Provisions of
the European Patent Convention

Patent protection in Europe arises from several international
treaties, such as the Paris Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty,
and the European Patent Convention (EPC).61 Of these agreements,
the EPC is the most important for an inventor desiring to patent an
invention in Europe today. The EPC established the European Patent
Organization, consisting of the Administrative Council and the European Patent Office (EPO).62 The EPO is responsible for implementing the EPC. 63 The EPC effectuates a "first-to-file system; ' 64 requires
that an applicant permit the subject matter of his prospective patent
to be published early; and provides a centralized system through
which an applicant can receive a bundle of national patents. 65 The
EPC functions to give a valid European patent application the effect
of a regular national application; 6 6 as a registration system, it creates a
group of national patents which "may only be challenged and enforced individually within the national jurisdictions of the designated
Contracting States. '67 _ ,
Thus, an inventor seeking to patent an invention in one or more
European Union (EU) 68 Member States may choose one of two methods: (1) file the patent with a national patent office and subsequently
file the patent in other countries to obtain protection; or (2) file the
60

See Group Faults, supra note 53, at 81.
Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268 [hereinafter European Patent Convention]; Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T.
7645, 9 I.L.M. 978; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, 13 U.S.T. 2, 828 U.N.T.S. 107, revised by Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 303; IAN MUIR ET AL., EUROPEAN PATENT LAW: LAW AND
PROCEDURE UNDER THE EPC AND PCT §§ 1.01-1.06, at 1-3 (2d ed. 2002); GERALD PATER61

SON, THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT CON-

§ 1-12, at 6 (2d ed. 2001).
A description of the EPO is available at http://www.european-patent-office.org.
See PATERSON, supra note 61, at 4.
64 The "first-to-file" system is different from the American patent system, which uses a
"first-to-invent" system. GERALD PATERSON, A CONCISE GUIDE TO EUROPEAN PATENTS: LAW
AND PRACTICE § 1-02, at 2 (1995).
65
Id. §§ 1-02-1-04, at 2-3.
66
MUIR ET AL., supra note 61, § 1-04, at 2.
67
See PATERSON, supra note 61, at 3.
68 The European Union (EU) has not succeeded in establishing a "Community patVENTION

62
63

ent" system.

SeeJOSEPH STRAUS, THE PRESENT STATE OF THE PATENT SYSTEM IN THE EURO-

PEAN UNION 3 (1997).
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patent with the European Patent Office to receive a bundle of national rights in designated EU Member States. 69 Regardless of the
chosen route, national office or EPO patents "have the same effect
70
and are subject to the same conditions.
Prior to the grant of a European patent, the EPO substantively
examines the patentability of each invention. 7 1 The patent must have
72
an "industrial application," be new, and involve an inventive step.
Even if an invention meets these criteria, Article 53(a) of the EPC
provides an important exception: the EPO will not grant patents
against ordre public or morality.7 3 Yet the EPC provides a qualification
that "exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary [to ordre public or morality] merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in
some or all of the Contracting States." 7 4 The Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office (EPO Guidelines) also recognize
that the EPO will exclude few inventions on this basis, as it applies a
test to "consider whether it is probable that the public in general
would regard the invention as so abhorrent that the grant of patent
rights would be inconceivable. ' 75 Should an inventor succeed in obtaining a patent through the EPO, the bundle of national patents lasts
for a term of twenty years from the date of the filing of the
application.

69
70
71

76

See id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6; European Patent Convention, supra note 61, at art. 2(2).
See MUIR ET AL., supra note 61, at 2.

European Patent Convention, supra note 61, art. 52(1).
Id. art. 53(a) (providing that "European patents shall not be granted in respect of:
(a) inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or
morality"). It is important to note that the Biotech Directive's morality provision does not
refer to the "publication" but simply to the "exploitation" of a patent. See Biotech Directive, supra note 12, art. 6(1).
It is important to distinguish between ordre public and morality to fully appreciate the
morality provisions. Philip Grubb has formulated the following distinction:
It has been suggested that the difference between ordrepublic and morality
is that adultery in private may or may not be considered immoral, but if you
do it in the street and frighten the horses, that is contrary to ordre public.
But a breach of ordre public means more than just what English law would
call disturbance of the peace; under German law it would mean a violation
of a basic constitutional right such as- the right to life, personal freedom,
human dignity, and freedom from bodily harm. Ordre public means the
proper order of society.
GRUBB, supra note 7, at 256.
74
European Patent Convention, supra note 61, art. 53(a).
75
PATERSON, supra note 61, at 433 (quoting The Guidelines of the European Patent
Office, Section C-tV, 3.1). Note, however, that the court appears to apply an "unacceptability test" as well as this "abhorrence test." See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
76
European Patent Convention, supra note 61, at art. 63(1).
72

73
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In contrast to the judicially created moral utility doctrine and its
diminishing role in the United States, 77 the European community
codified such a requirement into its patent registration laws in 1973.78
However, this requirement remained dormant until scientists sought
to patent a transgenic animal, known as the "Harvard Mouse. '79 Subsequent cases show that the question of whether the patent office
should invalidate a patent because it is contrary to public morality is
beginning to frequent the European patent system. However, the
EPO currently appears reluctant to invalidate patents as against public
80
morality.
D.

Patenting the Harvard Mouse in the United States and
Europe: The Moral Utility Doctrine on Vacation and
Article 53(a) at Work

When the Supreme Court declared human-made living organisms patentable subject matter in Diamond v. Chakrabaty,8 1 it opened
the way for patents of new micro-organisms or plants developed with
biotechnology. But with the growing biotechnological industry, patents such as the Harvard Mouse 2 -a mouse that scientists genetically
altered to make it more susceptible to cancer 83-amassed serious concerns over the question of patentable subject matter both in the
United States8 4 and Europe. 85 The process of patenting the Harvard
Mouse in the United States and Europe illustrates the contrasting approaches of these two patent systems.
77 See, e.g., Merges, supra note 35, at 1062-63 (explaining that by the 1970s, courts
were upholding patents on gambling devices because they were "wary of... an indeterminate moral standard").
78 See European Patent Convention, supra note 61, at art. 53(a).
79 See infra Part I.D; PATERSON, supra note 61, § 7-44, at 434-36.
80
See Howard Florey/Relaxin, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. 388 (Opposition Div.), reprinted in
1995 EUiR. PAT. OFF. REP.541, 552 (upholding ethical challenge to patent and recognizing
that the EPO is not the "right institution to decide fundamental ethical questions"); Plant
Genetic Systems/Glutamine Synthetase Inhibitors, 1995 EUR. PAT. OFF. REP. 357, 366-67
(Tech. Bd. App.) (upholding ethical challenge to patent, noting that moral requirements
will be applied on a case-by-case basis, and stating that the concept of patentability should
be as wide as possible); see also infra Part II.B (discussing the role of the EPO courts in
considering the morality of potential inventions).
81 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
82 U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988). The "Harvard Mouse" was the
first transgenic animal to be patented in the United States. See JoAnne Eichelberger
Seibold, Can Chakrabarty Survive the "HarvardMouse"?, 2 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 81,
81-82 (1988-1989). A transgenic animal is an animal that has foreign DNA, specifically a
gene, introduced into its genome. Today, many different transgenic animals are available
for sale to scientific laboratories.
83 Seibold, supra note 82, at 82.
84 See, e.g.,
id. at 96-99.
85 See David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, PatentingLiving Matter in the European Community: Diriment of the Draft Directive, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 990, 1014-16 (1992-1993).
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Shortly after the Chakrabartydecision, many cases raised questions
concerning its scope. 8 6 Yet the PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences' decisions broadly applied Chakrabarty,8 7 leading the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks to formally "announce[ ] the
PTO's intention to issue patents on non-naturally occurring, nonhuman multicellular living organisms." 88 In the first case, Ex parte Hibberd, the Board of Appeals and Interferences cited Chakrabarty,stating
that "the Supreme Court. . . has already interpreted the scope of Section 101 to cover everything under the sun made by man."8 9 The
Board further held that the Plant Patent Act9 ° and Plant Variety Protection Act91 did not narrow or restrict the scope of patentable subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.92 In the case which followed, Ex parte
Allen, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences upheld a patent
of human-made polyploid Pacific oysters-a significantly more complex organism than the bacteria in Chakrabarty--aspatentable subject
matter.9 3 The PTO followed its pattern of applying Chakrabarty
broadly by awarding a patent for the Harvard Mouse fewer than four
years after receiving the application. 9 4 For these biotechnological patent applications following Chakrabarty, the PTO's focus ostensibly revolved around whether the inventions constituted patentable subject
95
Almatter, rather than whether these inventions were immoral.
though the PTO granted the Harvard Mouse patent fairly quickly, the
86 See ExparteAllen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1426-27 (1987); Exparte Hibberd, 227
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 444 (1985).
87 See Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426-27; Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 445;
Seibold, supra note 82, at 88.
88

Bill on Animal Patentingis Approved by House Panel, 36 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT

J. 271, 272 (1988).
89 Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 447 (footnote omitted).
90
35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000).
91
7 U.S.C. § 2321 et seq. (2000).
92 See Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 444, 445-47.
93
See Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426-27.
94 See U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988); Donna M. Gitter, Led Astray by
the Moral Compass: IncorporatingMorality into European Union Biotechnology Patent Law, 19
BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 1, 26-27 (2001); Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues
Arising from Mixing Mice and Men, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 247, 252 (2000) ("The United
States Patent Act does not exclude any particular inventions from the scope of patentable
subject matter. In addition, the patent laws consistently have been broadly interpreted
with regard to the scope of patentable subject matter.").
95
This is not to suggest that the patenting of animals was not controversial in the
United States:
The idea of the patenting of higher organisms has encountered severe criticism for ethical and economic reasons, particularly in the USA, where a
moratorium on the grant of animal patents was introduced for a certain
period of time, where hearings were held to discuss ethical ramifications
and where a special bill, the "Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act," was
presented to the House of Representatives.
Harvard/Onco-mouse, 1989 O.J. E.P.O. 451 (Examining Div.), reprinted in 1990 EUR. PAT.
OFF. REP. 4, 10.
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patent nevertheless caused controversy in the United States. However, the public addressed their ethical concerns in legislative and
96
public debates, not in patent examiners' offices or in courtrooms.
The Harvard Mouse got caught in a "mousetrap" in Europe when
the Examining Division of the EPO first rejected the patent application for failure to constitute patentable subject matter. 9 7 More importantly, noting that "patent law is not the right legislative tool for
regulating problems which may arise [from ethical questions]," the
Examining Division did not refuse the patent under Article 53(a) on
the ground that it was immoral. 98 On appeal, the Technical Board of
Appeal reversed the Examining Division's decision by broadly interpreting the scope of patentable subject matter under the EPC.99 However, it remanded the case to the Examining Division to determine
whether the patent violated ordre public or morals under Article 53(a)
of the EPC. l00 The Board rejected the Examining Division's conclusion that patent law is not the right tool to make moral considerations:
[P]recisely in a case of this kind there are compelling reasons to
consider the implications of Article 53(a) EPC in relation to the
question of patentability. The genetic manipulation of mammalian
animals is undeniably problematical in various respects, particularly
where [it makes] ...an animal abnormally sensitive to carcinogenic

substances and stimuli and consequently prone to develop tumours,
which necessarily cause suffering. There is also a danger that genetically manipulated animals, if released into the environment, might
entail unforeseeable and irreversible adverse effects. 10 1
The Board wanted the Examining Division to weigh "the suffering of
animals and possible risks to the environment on the one hand, and
the invention's usefulness to mankind on the other."'1 2 On remand,
the Examining Division determined that in the overall balance, the
invention did not violate Article 53(a)103
96
Cynthia M. Ho, Note, Building a Better Mousetrap: PatentingBiotechnology in the European Community, 3 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 173, 184-85 (1992).
97
See Harvard/Onco-mouse,1990 EUR. PAT. OFF. REP. at 7-9 (holding that Article 53(b)
prohibits granting the patent because it applies to an animal variety).
98 Id. at 11. The argument that a legislative body and not the patent system should
consider the morality, and therefore that the EPC should remove Article 53(a), is common. See PATERSON, supra note 61, at 433. However, Gerald Paterson counterargues that
public order and morality provide the foundation for every legal system, and it is useful to
allow third parties to object to the patenting of certain inventions. See id. at 434.
99 Harvard/Onco-mouse, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476 (Tech. Bd. App.), reprinted in 1990
EUR. PAT. OFF. REP. 501, 509-11.
100 Harvard/Onco-mouse, 1991 EUR. PAT. OFF. REP. 525, 526 (Examining Div.).
101
Harvard/Onco-mouse, 1990 EUR. PAT. OFF. REP. at 513.
102
Harvard/Onco-mouse, 1991 EUR. PAT. OFF. REP. at 526. The Examining Division
noted that the case had attracted a lot of public attention. Id.
103
Id. at 528. "When the EPO announced in 1992 that it intended to approve the
Onco-mouse patent application, protests arose throughout Europe.... [As of 2001,] the
outcome of the opposition proceedings ha[d] not yet been decided, and it [was] expected
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Role of the Biotech Directive in the European Patent System

Scholars and journalists heralded the Biotech Directive,1 0 4 which
the European Union enacted after years of debate 10 5 in order to
remobilize the European patent system. 10 6 Yet "[n] ever has a piece of
European Union legislation lit such a huge bonfire of public controversy."' 07 Prior to its enactment, the Commission ordered an advisory
committee on biotechnological ethics to "comb [ ] through" the Directive's provisions "to prevent Frankenstein-like inventions [from] being
legitimised by a patent."'0 18 As a result, the Directive "represents a
compromise between the biotech industry and its supporters ... and
the various factions opposing the Directive on moral, ethical, environmental, and economic grounds. . . ."109 Article 6(1) of the Directive
provides: "Inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their
commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality." 110 Although the EU enacted Article 6(1) as a compromise, it is
one of the Directive's most controversial provisions."' The Directive
further excludes the following items from patentability:
(a) processes for cloning human beings;
(b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human
beings;
(c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes;
[and]
(d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which
are likely to cause them suffering without any substantial medical
benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting from such
processes.

112

to be affected by the [then] recent Directive." Gitter, supra note 94, at 29-30. The EPC
allows either the EPO itself or third parties to raise objections to patents. See PATERSON,
supra note 61, at 434. Recently, third parties have objected to certain patents on moral
grounds. See discussion infra Part I.F.
104
Biotech Directive, supra note 12.
105
Gitter, supra note 94, at 1.
106
STRAus, supra note 68, at 4 ("Whereas the United States [has adapted its patent
system to meet revolutionary technological developments], the European patent system
has remained virtually unaffected by these developments and appears immobilized."). The
European Commission has also proposed a "Community Patent" system, which would "give
inventors the option of obtaining a single patent legally valid throughout the European
Union." Commission Proposes the Creation of a Community Patent, EUR. UNION ONLINE, at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal market/en/indprop/patent/2k-714.htm (July
5, 2002).
107
Biotechnology: Moral Maze Continues To Dominate Patent Debate, EUR. ENV'T, Oct. 25,
1994.
108
Id.
109
Gitter, supra note 94, at 13.
110
Biotech Directive, supra note 12, art. 6,
1. This provision is similar to that of
Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention. See European Patent Convention, supra
note 61, art. 53(a).
111
Gitter, supra note 94, at 2-3.
112
Biotech Directive, supra note 12, art. 6,
2(a)-(d).
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The Biotech Directive requires patent offices and courts to continue to confront the questions of whether patents are contrary to
public morals.1 13 The EU enacted the Directive to update an "outdated legal framework" and to follow the two leading nations in biotechnology-the United States and Japan-that have successfully
adapted their patent protection to recent technological changes.14
The Commission sought to stimulate the European biotechnology industry in several ways. 1 15 The Commission wanted "effective and harmonized

protection

.

.

.

in order to maintain

and encourage

investment in the field of biotechnology"'1 16 and thus "eliminate barriers to the exchange of information and technology among Member
States."' 1 7 Furthermore, the Directive would counteract existing trade
barriers that could "impede the proper functioning of the internal
market""1 8 and "lead to further disincentives to trade." 119 Finally, with
"harmonization and legal certainty," this new patent protection would
"enhance investment opportunities in the biotech industry" within Eu120
rope, "attract[ing] foreign investors."'
Although the Directive binds only European Union Member
States,t21 it will affect the majority of those Contracting States to the
EPC because there is a large overlap between EU Member States and
EPC Contracting States. 122 Since the EPC already has Article 53(a) to
invalidate patents that are against the ordre public or morality, what will
the Biotech Directive's similar morality provisions add?
An EU directive obliges all Member States to ensure the provision's effectiveness. 1 23 Because each Member State must update its
national patent laws to comply with the Biotech Directive's morality
provisions, the national bundle of patents that the EPC grants will currently be enforced within national jurisdictions with similar patent
laws. Thus, the Directive's morality provisions will have a broader effect on European biotech patents than does EPC Article 53(a), which

114
115

Id. at art 6, 1 1.
Gitter, supra note 94, at 9.
See Biotech Directive, supra note 12,

116

Id.

113

117

1-9.

1 3.

Gitter, supra note 94, at 9; see Biotech Directive, supra note 12,
7.
Biotech Directive, supra note 12, 5.
119 Id. 1 5, 7.
120
Gitter, supra note 94, at 9.
121
See Biotech Directive, supra note 12, at art. 1, 1 1. Article 1, paragraph 2 of the
Biotech Directive notes that the Directive "shall be without prejudice to the obligations of
the Member States pursuant to international agreements, and in particular the TRIPs
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity." Id. at art. 1,
2.
122
See MUIR ET AL., supra note 61, at 308-09 (listing the current members of the EPC);
STRAUS, supra note 68, at 1 n.3 (listing the current EU Member States).
123
See Biotech Directive, supra note 12, at art. 1, 1 ("[Member States] shall, if necessary, adjust their national patent law to take account of the provisions of this Directive.");
PATERSON, supra note 61, at 13.
118
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acts as more of a screening device to patent registration. 1 24 However,
the Member States have been slow to incorporate the Biotech Directive into their national laws, demonstrating the continuing controversy over the Directive. Article 15 of the Biotech Directive provides:
"Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive not later
than 30 July 2000."125 Despite this provision, as of July 2002, only six
Member States had incorporated the Directive into their national
laws. 1 26 A recent report by the Commission to the European Communities concludes: "If such a situation were to continue, it would have
the effect of considerably hampering the development of biotechnology in Europe." 12 7 However, by a Decision of the Administrative
Council of the EPO, the EPC incorporated the Directive's "main pro128
visions," including Article 6, into its "Implementing Regulations."
Two recent decisions reflect the uncertain effect of the enactment of
the Biotech Directive.
F.

"Mousing Around" Again: After the Biotech Directive

Patents do not give positive rights of exploitation, yet third parties
challenge these rights in opposition proceedings. It is suggested that
third parties challenge patents because (1) "it is easier and cheaper to
oppose a patent than to mount a lobbying campaign for a piece of
legislation," and (2) "patents appear to be a potent symbol of commercial exploitation."' 29 A third possible reason is the amount of media attention that opposition proceedings produce. Third parties can
draw even more attention to their causes by lodging opposition proceedings in addition to petitioning legislators. The following two
cases evidence this point.
1. R v. Leland Stanford/Modified Animal
[T]issues are obtained directly in the operating room as fetal parts
after elective or medically-indicated abortion ....

Without main-

taining strict sterility, these parts are taken immediately to a gross
dissection room. The desired tissues are identified, dissected out

125

See supra Part I.C.
Biotech Directive, supra note 12, at art. 15,

126

COMM'N EUR. COMMUNITIES, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PAR-

124

1.

LIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL: DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLICATIONS OF PATENT LAW IN THE FIELD

6 (July 10, 2002), at http://www.europa.eu.
[hereinafter DEVELOPMENT AND
int/eur-lex/en/com/rpt/2002/com2002O545en01.pdf
OF BIOTECHNOLOGY AND GENETIC ENGINEERING
IMPLICATIONS REPORT].

Id.
128 Id. at 7. For a text of the implementation, see Notice Concerning the Amendment
of the Implementing Regulations to the European Patent Convention (July 1, 1999) (on
file with author).
129 See GRUBB, supra note 7, at 260.
127
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....
Tissue has been introduced [into the mice] by a number of
routes: intravenously, intrarenally, intrasplenically, or
0
subcutaneously. 13
On December 22, 1988, Stanford University filed an application
with the EPO for the patenting of "chimeric immunocompromised
non-human mammals" (the "Stanford patent").131 In their patent application, the researchers described the process of transplanting
3 2
human fetal tissues into "immunocompromised" mice or horses.'
An animal is "immunocompromised" if it has a severely deficient immune system, although it may still contain functioning immune system organs. 13 3 The inventors envisioned introducing into these hosts
"fetal tissue, fetal liver tissue providing stem cells, thymus tissue, where
the thymus grows into a competent thymus organ, and lymph node
tissue, where the lymph node tissue grows into a competent lymph
node, and the stem cells are processed to produce functional human
B- and T-cells." The inventors described the potential benefits of this
patent thus:
The cells grow and produce products native to the cells, including
progeny cells, which may find use in research, production of antibodies, production of physiologically active products, as transplants,
and in numerous other applications. The method involves introduction of the cells in an appropriate site or environment in the animal
134
host to provide a chimeric host.
When the EPO awarded these researchers a patent on March 1,
1995, three groups immediately opposed the patent before the Opposition Division (OD) of the EPO.135 Seeking to invalidate the Stanford patent on the ground that it violated Article 53(a) of the EPC,
the opponents argued that "it was intrinsically unethical and against
the general moral principles of Western society to grant patents on
life." 13 6 However, the OD stated that Article 6(2) of the Biotech Directive,' 37 incorporated into the EPC's regulations, demonstrates that
138
it is not intrinsically unethical in Western society to patent animals.
The OD next "weighed up the potential medical benefits of the [Stanford patent] against the possible suffering of the animals," concluding
Eur. Patent No. 0322240 (issued Mar. 1, 1995).
Id. As described above, the researchers sought a bundle of national patents in the
following countries: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, France, Great Britain,
Greece, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Id.
132
Id.
130
131

133

Id.

Id.
SeeR. v. Leland Stanford/Modified Animal, 2002 EUR. PAT. OFF. REP. 16, 18 (Opposition Div.). By the time of oral arguments, only one opponent of the patent remained. Id.
136
Id. at 21.
137
See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
138
See Leland Stanford/Modified Animal, 2002 EUR. PAT. OFF. REP. at 22.
134
135
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that the substantial and enormous medical benefits outweighed the
"hypothetical potential risks."1 39 The OD premised its conclusion on
two basic points. First, it explained that Article 53(a) would notjustify
"deny[ing] a patent .

.

. merely on the basis of possible, rather than

conclusively documented hazards." 140 Second, and more importantly,
the court noted that it "is not vested with carrying out the task of monitoring and estimating such risks; this is rather a matter for the numerous regulatory authorities charged with regulating research and
14 1
medical practice."
The opponents to the Stanford patent also argued that "it is ethically unacceptable to create animal-human chimeras such as those of
the [Stanford] patent, and in doing so to take cells and tissue from
aborted foetuses or children aged below three years of age as a source
of human tissues. ' 142 The OD concurred that at first glance the use of
these cells "instinctively appears distasteful, if not immoral." 143 Yet the
OD explained that
as long as a claimed invention has a legitimate use, it cannot be the
role of the EPO to act as a moral censor and invoke the provisions of
Article 53(a) EP.C to refuse on ethical grounds to grant a patent on
legal research and directed to an invention indisputably associated
144
with medical benefits.
In passing, the OD acknowledged the controversial nature of the invention 145 but thought "[i] t would be presumptuous . .. to interfere
146
in [the] public debate."

2.

The Edinburgh Patent

There has developed a pressing need to isolate and maintain in vitro
embryonic stem cells from other murine strains and more especially
from other species including other laboratory animals (e.g. rats,
rabbits and guinea pigs), domesticated animals (e.g. sheep, goats,
14 7
horses, cattle, pigs, birds, fish, etc.) and primates.
On April 24, 1995, the University of Edinburgh sought to patent
the "[i]solation, selection and propagation of animal transgenic stem
cells" (the Edinburgh patent). 148 The creators described their inven139
140
141
142

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.

143

Id. (emphasis added).

144

Id. (emphasis added).

Id. (noting that the invention had been "the subject of intensive discussion in the
media and among members of the public").
145

146

Id.

147

Eur. Patent No. 695351 (issued Dec. 8, 1999).
Id.

148
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tion as "relat[ing] to methods of isolating and/or enriching and/or
selectively propagating animal stem cells, genetically modified animal
cells and animals for use in said method, transgenic animals providing
a source of such cells and selectable marker constructs for producing
genetically modified cells and transgenic animals.' 1 49 The EPO
granted the Edinburgh patent after the Biotech Directive took effect.
Subsequently, national and international press alleged that the patent
constituted human cloning.' 50 Much of the initial uproar regarding
the Edinburgh patent resulted from its ambiguous language referring
to the preparation of a transgenic animal. Because a human is a type
of animal in scientific usage, opponents thought that this patent encompassed human cloning methods. 151 The University of Edinburgh
subsequently sought to amend its patent to limit its application to
15 2
nonhumans.
On April 14, 2000, the OD gave its preliminary opinion on the
amended set of claims, stating that the subject matter of the Edinburgh patent's claims regarding stem cell research did not violate Article 53(a) of the EPC. 15 3 "[T]he governments of Germany, Italy and
the Netherlands, and the German branch of Greenpeace, are among
the parties that .

.

. lodged oppositions to the [Edinburgh] patent,"

and oral arguments started on July 22, 2002.154 In a recent opinion,
the OD held that the original Edinburgh patent violated Article 53 (a)
but that the amended Edinburgh patent is "to be maintained . . .
[since it] no longer includes human or animal embryonic stem cells,
but still covers modified human and animal stem cells other than embryonic stem cells." 15 5 Thus, despite both the public outcry concern-

ing the Stanford and Edinburgh patents and the Biotech Directive,
the EPO has been reluctant to apply the morality provisions of the
EPC.

149
Id. "A stem cell is an (1) undifferentiated cell (2) that can divide without limit and
(3) whose progeny includes both further stem cells or cells destined to differentiate."
GEERTRUI VAN OVERWALLE, EUR. COMM'N, STUDY ON THE PATENTING OF INVENTIONS RELATED
TO HUMAN STEM CELL RESEARCH 8 (2001). For an explanation of the basic concepts relating to human stem cell research, see id. at 8-38.

150
151

152
153

Id. at 58.
Id. at 58-59.

Id. at 59.
Id. at 60.
154
Press Release, European Patent Office, Opposition Hearing on Genetic Stem-cell
Patent at the European Patent Office (July 18, 2002), available at http://www.european-pat
ent-office.org/news/pressrel/2002_07_18_e.htm.
155
Press Release, European Patent Office, "Edinburgh" Patent Limited After European Patent Office Opposition Hearing (July 24, 2002), available at http://www.europeanpatent-office.org/news/pressrel/2002_07_24-e.htm.
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CRITICISM OF THE BIOTECH DIRECTvE'S

MORALITY PROVISIONS

Biotechnology demands strong, clear patent laws. Research in
biotechnology is not only controversial, but also extremely important.
"Without biotechnology, we are effectively prevented from devising
the much needed solutions to dietary, health, environmental and
other problems that plague us at record rates. 1 56 The European
Union recognized the "fundamental importance" of biotechnological
research in passing the Biotech Directive,1 57 but critics of the morality
provisions recognize the risk such provisions raise of dampening the
desirable economic benefits of strong biotechnology patent laws.
A.

Do the Biotech Directive's Morality Provisions Create a
Competitive Disadvantage?

Opponents of the morality provisions claim that excluding patents on the ground of immorality will competitively disadvantage Europe with respect to the United States and Japan. 158 If the Biotech
Directive competitively disadvantages Europe, then it seems to have
failed its stated purpose of benefiting Europe's biotechnology industry
and economy. 159 EU states now surpass the United States in the number of biotechnological companies and publications, 160 but "the long
delay in granting procedures at the EPO" still hampers those seeking
patent protection in Europe. 16 1 The cases of the Harvard Mouse, the
Stanford patent, and the Edinburgh patent 6 2 demonstrate that the
Directive permits third parties to protract the granting process at the
EPO by challenging the validity of a patent on moral grounds.1 63 Pro156 James R. Chiapetta, Comment, Of Mice and Machine: A ParadigmaticChallenge to Interpretation of the Patent Statute, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 155, 160 (1994).
157 Biotech Directive, supra note 12,
1.
158 See Deryck Beyleveld et al., The Morality Clauses of the Directive on the Legal Protectionof
BiotechnologicalInventions: Conflict, Compromise and the Patent Community, in PHARMACEUTICAL
MEDICINE, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND EUROPEAN LAw 157, 161 (Richard Goldberg & Julian
Lonbay eds., 2000). Beyleveld terms this the "local objection." Id. The second principal
ground for exclusion is a "general objection" that "morality as such has no business being
considered within the patent system." Id.
159 See supra Part I.E.
160 See DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLICATIONS REPORT, supra note 126, at 31.
161 See id. at 35.
162 See supra Parts I.D, I.F.
163 Beyleveld and others respond to objections that the morality provisions will place
Europe at a competitive disadvantage. They note:
(a) Whether or not Europe is placed at a competitive disadvantage against
the United States and Japan will depend on what criteria of morality are
employed.
(b) Being placed at a competitive disadvantage against the United States/
Japan could, in certain cases, have morally bad consequences which could
override the prima facie immorality involved in granting a patent. Thus,
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cedural delay as well as legal uncertainty and failure to harmonize sys-

tems may competitively disadvantage Europe's patent system as
compared with that of the United States or Japan.
1.

Legal Certainty and Ambiguity: Kingdom of the Netherlands
v. European Parliament and Council

I would however firstly note... that the Directive breaches the principle of legal certainty, because it lacks the clarity necessary for the
Member States to determine how to accurately implement the directive. This has been fully proved in the time that has past [sic] since
the adoption of the directive. The fact ... that the directive has yet
to be implemented in the majority of the Member States of the European Union, despite the fact that the time-limit for implementa164
tion expired ... is also clear proof of this.
Drafters of the Biotech Directive acknowledged that biotechnological inventions require a strong and clear set of patent laws to protect biotech inventors' expectations:
Biotechnology and genetic engineering are playing an increasingly
important role in a broad range of industries and the protection of
biotechnological inventions will certainly be of fundamental importance for the Community's industrial development ... [I]n particular..., the field of genetic engineering, research and development
require a considerable amount of high-risk investment ... [Olnly adequate
165
legal protection will make them profitable.
Yet the Biotech Directive allows the exclusion of patents based on undefined terms (ordre public or morality) that contradict the Directive's
express goal of providing "adequate legal protection" for these "highrisk investments." For these reasons, the Netherlands sought to annul
166
the Biotech Directive after its enactment.
considerations of morality could even argue for permitting particular
patents.
(c) It is by no means axiomatic that patents... are necessary to encourage
the investment required to protect European economic interests in
biotechnology.
(d) If, all things considered, it would be immoral . . . to grant a particular
patent, then the patent must be denied; the fact that this would place Europe at a competitive disadvantage is no overriding objection.
Beyleveld et al., supra note 158, at 161.
164
The Norwegian Statement at the Oral Hearing on 13 February 2001 Before the
Court of Justice of the European Community in Case C-377/98; the Kingdom of the
Netherlands Against European Parliament and Council of the European Union Concerning the Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, at http://odin.
dep.no/ud/norsk/handelspolitikk/032061-990022/index-dokOO-b-n-a.html
(last visited
Oct. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Norwegian Statement].
165
Biotech Directive, supra note 12,
1, 2 (emphasis added).
166
See Norwegian Statement, supra note 164.
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In Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council of
the European Union,16 7 the Netherlands, Italy, and Norway (NIN)
sought to annul the Biotech Directive for violating the principle of
legal certainty, on the grounds that ordre public and morality are ambiguous terms.1 68 NIN argued that "Article 6 gives insufficient guidance and the principles mentioned in the recitals for determining
whether there is an infringement of ordre public or morality are general
and equivocal."' 169 NIN recognized that because patent offices would
"turn to the ethical and moral principles recognised in a Member
State to supplement the standard legal examinations under patent law
...therefore inevitabl[y] Article 6 [would] be interpreted and applied divergently."' 7 0 The Advocate General disagreed with NIN.171
First, the Advocate General noted that "ordre public and morality
have a long and distinguished history as criteria for the lawfulness of
the grant or exercise of intellectual property rights,"'1 72 as Article

53(a) of the EPC illustrates.1 73 The Advocate General further noted
that European Union community trademark law "continues this pattern" by "provid [ing] for the refusal of registration or invalidity of a
mark which is 'contrary to public policy or to accepted principles of
morality."' 174 The Advocate General also explained that the Community legislature frequently resorts to the concept of ordre public in harmonizing measures, "thus apparently seeing no contradiction in
conferring a degree of discretion on national authorities in an area
subject to harmonisation."17 5 Regardless of the reasons for refusing to
annul the Biotech Directive for breach of the principle of legal cer167
Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council
of the European Union, 2001 E.C.R. 1-7079, 2001 3 C.M.L.R. 49. The Netherlands, Norway, and Italy are not the only countries to protest certain provisions of the Biotech Directive; in early 2002, Luxembourg called for a renegotiation of the Biotech Directive due to
concerns about Article 5, which concerns the patentability of certain parts of the human
body. See Biotechnology: Luxembourg Parliament Calls for Re-negotiation of Inventions Directive,
EUR. REI., Mar. 6, 2002.
168 Kingdom of the Netherlands, 2001 3 C.M.L.R.
All, 35.
169 Id. A94 (emphasis added).

170

Id.

An Advocate General questions the parties and presents an opinion to the Court of
Justice, which the court may or may not follow in rendering its judgment. Here, the court
followed the opinion of the Advocate General. Compare id. A230 with RI. For general
information on the structure of the Court of Justice, see the website of the Court ofJustice
of the European Communities at http://curia.eu.int/en/instit/presentationfr/index.htm.
172 Kingdom of the Netherlands, 2001 3 C.M.L.R.
A95.
173 The court's response to the NIN's concerns noted that Article 53(a) of the EPC is
substantially similar to Article 6(1) of the Biotech Directive is insufficient. Article 53(a)'s
morality provisions have been tested on relatively few occasions-and one would be hard
pressed to say that their application in the Harvard Mouse instance proved that ordre public
and morality are solid standards by which patent examiners should judge inventions. See
supra Part I.D.
174 Kingdom of the Netherlands, 2001 3 C.M.L.R.
A96.
175 Id. A98.
171
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tainty, the compromise Directive may nonetheless "create more uncer176
tainty and controversy."
2.

Harmonization and Potentially Differing Applications of Moral
Considerations

As noted earlier, the Biotech Directive represents a compromise
77
between the biotech industry and opponents of biotech research.'
This agreement will not likely harmonize European patent law-one
of the Biotech Directive's stated goals- 7 8-because concepts of morality change with time and place and vary even within a single country at
1 79
a single time.

The Netherlands challenged the Directive out of concern that
each Member State would apply a different standard of morality to
patents.18 0 Existing evidence demonstrates that some European
Union Member States, for example, are more open to the idea of
cloning than others.' 8 ' In fact, in seeking to annul the Directive, the
Netherlands objected to the "notion that plants, animals and parts of
the human body may be patentable."' 1 2 In response to these concerns, the Advocate General in Kingdom of The Netherlands explained
that "[t]he application by national authorities of the concepts of ordre
public and morality, however, will always be subject to review by the
Court: Member States do not have an unlimited discretion to determine their scope."1 83 The Advocate General described the court's
standard for determining which inventions are contrary to ordre public
or morals as similar to that applied by the EPO-namely, to "exclude
from protection inventions likely to induce riot or public disorder, or
to lead to criminal or other generally offensive behaviour.' 84 But the
EPO does not apply this single standard consistently:
[H]armonization will.., remain elusive under the Directive. As it is
drafted, the ambiguity of the Directive's Article 6 invites inconsistent interpretations, even from judges committed to achieving uniformity. An examination of cases decided by the EPO under the
EPC's morality provision ...demonstrates that the morality proviHo, supra note 94, at 284.
See supra Part I.E.
178
Biotech Directive, supra note 12, 3.
179
GRUBB, supra note 7, at 257 (noting that morality is a "shakier ground" to deny
patents than ordre public).
180 See supra Part H.A.1.
181 See Gitter, supra note 94, at 18 ("Article 6 will be subject to widely varying interpretations throughout the Member States, which differ greatly in their acceptance of emergent biotechnological inventions.").
182
See Kingdom of the Netherlands, 2001 3 C.M.L.R. I AO.
183
Id. A101.
184
Id. A1Ol.
176
177

PROTECTING SOCIETY

2004]

709

to inconsistent interpretations even by a single
sion has been subject
85
adjudicatory body. 1
Notably, in the face of controversial subject matter, the Opposition
Division of the EPO has indicated that it would pass on excluding certain patents under Article 53(a) of the EPC: "[T]here is at present no
consensus in European society about the desirability [of the Stanford
patent], and public opinion is still being formed on this and related
matters. It would be presumptuous for the EPO to interfere in this
public debate."1 8 6 Furthermore, one could argue that even courts
may inconsistently apply the standard asserted in Kingdom of the
187
Netherlands.
Despite the court's decision regarding harmonization and legal
certainty, a recent report from the European Union recognizes that
one advantage of the United States' patent system is that the PTO has
"guidelines [that provide] legal certainty by giving a clear definition of
what can be considered a biotechnological invention and what is eligible for patent protection."' 8 8 These issues may continue to place the
growth of Europe's patent system and biotechnology sector behind
that of the United States and Japan.
B.

Patent Examiners as Moral Censors

The reluctance of patent examiners-trained to evaluate the technical merits of inventions-to evaluate morality is not surprising. On
the other hand, granting controversial patents in the face of a
mandatory morality consideration appears to have made the EPO a
victim of special interest groups who are critical of
biotechnology.

18

9

The strongest general criticism of the EPC and Biotech Directive's morality provisions has come from the EPO courts them185
Gitter, supra note 94, at 18; id. at 21 (noting that the EPO has applied a "'public
abhorrence'" standard as well as an "'unacceptability'" test in Article 53(a) morality-based
challenges to patents). Donna Gitter proposes refining the Directive so as to apply a consistent moral standard (either "abhorrence" or "unacceptability"), id. at 40, then further
refining and clarifying these tests so as to "furnish proper guidance to the national courts
and patents offices administering it." Id. at 42. Grubb argues that patent examiners are as
well suited as any member of society to apply the "abhorrence test." See GRUBB, supra note
7, at 258. However, he notes that if the test applied is the balancing test articulated by the
Technical Board of Appeals in the "Harvard Mouse" case, examiners would be "wholly
incapable of such a task." See id.
186
R. v. Leland Stanford/Modified Animal, 2002 EUR. PAT. OFF. REP. 16, 23 (Opposition Div.) (applying the public abhorrence test).
187
As the concepts of ordre public and morality differ from country to country, courts
would apply these terms differently, producing varied results. Such varied results would
conflict with the Directive's goal of increasing harmony in the law of the European patent
community.
188
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLICATIONS REPORT, supra note 126, at 37.
189
Ho, supra note 94, at 284.
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selves. 190 EPO courts initially voiced reservations about their ability to

act as moral gatekeepers prior to the enactment of the Biotech Directive. When the Examining Division (ED) of the EPC first considered
the patent application for the Harvard Mouse, questions arose about
whether the patent violated ordre public or morality. 19 1 In that case,
the ED concluded that "patent law is not the right legislative tool for
regulating problems" relating to the ethical considerations of animal
patents. 19 2 The Technical Board of Appeals disagreed, noting that
this was precisely the kind of case in which "there are compelling reasons to consider the implications of Article 53(a) [EPC] in relation to
the question of patentability. " 1 9 3 On remittal, the ED concluded that

19 4
the patent application violated neither ordre public nor morality.
Furthermore, when Greenpeace opposed the Plant Genetic Systems/
Glutamine Synthetase Inhibitors patent of a genetically engineered
plant, the Technical Board of Appeal once again noted that
"[a] lthough it may be difficult to judge whether or not a claimed subject-matter is contrary to 'ordre public' or morality, the provisions of
Article 53(a) [EPC] may not be disregarded by the EPO when assess95
ing patentability."'
Even after the Technical Board of Appeal's ruling in the Harvard
Mouse case and the enactment of the Biotech Directive, both the Examining and Opposition Divisions remained reluctant to acknowledge
and embrace their roles as moral gatekeepers. The Stanford Patent
case illustrates that EPO courts continued to be loath to address the
morality issue. 196 In that case, the Opposition Division (OD) noted
that "as long as a claimed invention has a legitimate use, it cannot be
the role of the EPO to act as moral censor and invoke the provisions
of Article 53(a) EPC to refuse on ethical grounds." 19 7 The court also
thought it "presumptuous" to interfere in the public debate regarding
animal-human chimeras. 198 Although the EPO courts hesitate to act
as moral censors, and their case law on the issue is "at best cursory,"'199

Beyleveld et al., supra note 158, at 161.
See supra Part I.D.
1989 OJ.E.P.O. 451 (Examining Div.), reprinted in 1990 EUR. PAT. OFF. REP. 4, 11.
193
1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476 (Tech. Bd. App.), reprinted in 1990 EUR. PAT. OFF. REP. 501,
513. The Technical Board of Appeals noted concern regarding the release of genetically
modified animals into the wild. Id. However, most scientists would argue that this concern
is not well founded. Chiapetta, supra note 156, at 180-81. Scientists also argue that patent
law is not the correct context in which to discuss the difficult moral question of whether it
is right for an animal to die in order to save a human life. Id at 183-84.
194
Harvard/Onco-mouse, 1991 EUR. PAT. OFF. RP. 525, 528 (Examining Div.).
195
Plant Genetic Systems/Glutamine Synthetase Inhibitors, 1995 EUR. PAT. OFF. REP.
190
191
192

357, 368 (Tech. Bd. App.).
196
2002 EUR. PAT. OFF. REP. 16, 23 (Opposition Div.).
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Ho, supra note 94, at 283.
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the Biotech Directive ensures that courts will consider ethical aspects
of patents-whether they believe such consideration to be proper or
not. Nevertheless, the court has never denied a patent for being immoral, 20 0 and the proceedings have undoubtedly slowed the patent
process.
Several reasons exist as to why EPO courts are reluctant to consider or invalidate patents for being contrary to ordre public or morality. First, moral standards are difficult to ascertain. 20 1 Second, these
patent authorities lack the "expertise or authority" to consider ethics. 2 0 2 Third, "moral ideas change quite rapidly as compared with patent lifetimes." 20 3 Fourth, moral ideas differ among European
countries. 20 4 Lastly, law should forbid abhorrent inventions independent of patent requirements, 20 5 a criticism that the EPO courts have
20 6
voiced.
Further drafting problems with the morality provisions of the
EPC and the Biotech Directive may increase the EPO courts' reluctance to act as moral censors as well as their ability to judge what is
immoral. 20 7 First, the language of Article 6(1) of the Biotech Directive refers to the immorality of the "commercial exploitation" of the
invention, not the immorality of granting monopolistic power to the
inventor. 20 8 When judging the immorality of "commercial exploitation," the examiner may look backward at the ethical nature of the
research used in the patent application or simply look forward to the
future uses of the patent, as the language of the Directive offers no
guidance either way. One may argue that the language of Article 6(1)
seems to emphasize only the morality of the future "commercial exploitation" of the invention, leaving irrelevant the manner in which
200
Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the
United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair Use
Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1623, 1655-56 (2001).
201
Beyleveld et al., supra note 158, at 161. But see id. at 162 ( "Moral standards are only
difficult to judge if no standards are-laid down for examiners or judges to employ.").
202
See id. at 161. But see id. at 162 ("If patent examiners lack moral expertise, they
should be replaced by persons who have it.").
203
Id. at 161. But see id. at 162 (contending that while some moral standards change,
others remain relatively stable).
204
Id. at 161. But see id. at 162 (noting that some standards vary across Europe, but
others do not).
205
Id. at 161. But see id. at 162 ("Although it may be true that technical procedures
that are morally abhorrent should be forbidden by law and not merely denied patent protection, it does not follow that technical inventions that are morally abhorrent cannot also
be denied patent protection.").
206
See Harvard/Onco-mouse, 1989 OJ. E.P.O. 451 (Examining Div.), reprintedin 1990
EUR. PAT. OFF. REP. 4, 11 ("[T]he Examining Division concludes that the patent law is not
the right legislative tool.").
207
See Beyleveld et al., supra note 158, at 163-65.
208
See Biotech Directive, supra note 12, art. 6(1); Beyleveld et al., supra note 158, at
164.
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the invention was researched and developed. 20 9 However, supporters
of incorporating morality into patent law recognize that Article 6(1)
leaves room for "distorted reading[s].

''

21 °

Second, as noted above, the Biotech Directive fails to define a

2 11
standard for determining what is immoral or against ordre public.

This problem not only lessens the likelihood of increased harmonization among EU Member States, but it will also make it difficult for the
EPO courts to consider how to determine what is immoral or against
ordre public.

2 12

Third, the Biotech Directive's morality provisions leave open important procedural issues that the EPC does not address. Questions
may arise as to whether the patent-granting authority should assess the
morality of the invention at the time of the patent application. 213 If
so, it is unclear whether the applicant is responsible for such a showing. 21 4 Additionally, it is unclear whether the EPO should apprise po-

tential opponents to the application of its contents before the EPO
21 5
grants the patent.
Yet the Biotech Directive did partially respond to the EPO courts'
difficulty with questions of morality by providing a list of items that the
EPO will automatically exclude. 2 16 This list provides inventors in biotechnology with items to avoid attempting to patent because courts
are certain to refuse to patent them. The problem arises when a proposed invention is not on this list but is nonetheless controversial.
The Biotech Directive requires that inventors of such controversial
items weigh the benefits of obtaining patent protection in Europe
with the burden of delay on the Examining or Opposition Division in
determining the invention's morality. The health of European biotechnology may suffer as a result. Inventors of such items in the
United States do not-and should not-face these questions.

209
See Beyleveld et al., supra note 158, at 166. Beyleveld and others argue that Article
6(1) of the Biotech Directive should instead focus on the morality of exercising "monopoly
control" over the invention, so as to preclude a wider range of controversial inventions,
and to look both backward and forward at the morality of patenting the invention. Id. at
165-67.
210
211
212
213
214
215

Id. at 166.

See supra Part I.E.
Id.

See Gitter, supra note 94, at 39.
Id.

See id.

Biotech Directive, supra note 12, art. 6,
nying text.
216

2(a)-(d); see supra note 112 and accompa-
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III
LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES REGARDING THE FUTURE
OF THE

MORAL

UTILITY DOCTRINE

Suppose a patent examiner is considering whether to grant a patent for a biotechnological invention. The obvious question that the
patent examiner must ask is whether the invention meets the statutory
requirements for patentability. Should the patent examiner also ask
whether society should benefit from this invention? To answer the second question, the patent examiner must make some ultimate judgment based on moral and ethical considerations.2 1 7 Should patent
law address these ethical issues and define what is or is not moral, or
are these determinations better left to laws outside the patent system? 2 18 Europe's view differs from that of the United States.
Morality has been an integral part of European patent law since
the European Patent Convention. 2 19 In contrast, courts and patent
examiners in the United States appear to focus little on whether a
patent or invention meets ethical requirements. Although the PTO
still claims to evaluate the morality of patents, denial or invalidation of
a patent for being immoral is rare. 220 Some commentators in the
United States claim that patent law is not the proper forum for determining ethical standards of scientific activity and that other agencies
of the government should regulate the research or exploitation of
controversial inventions. 22' Furthermore, courts seem uncertain
whether to refer to or apply the moral utility doctrine at all when
describing the requirements of usefulness. 2 22 Fortunately, in the face
of the ever-growing controversy that biotechnological research produces, the United States may consider the European patent system's
reliance on its morality provisions as well as criticism of that system.
Consideration of the benefits and drawbacks of the European system
may help the United States decide whether to revive the moral utility
doctrine.
This Note detailed several different criticisms of the Biotech Directive and the EPC's morality provisions. The recently decided case
217

See RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, THE MEANING OF IT ALL: THOUGHTS OF A CITIZEN SCIENTIST

44-47 (1998).
218 See Strimpel, supra note 8, at 284; see also Ho, supra note 94, at 285 ("Patents are at
best a blunt tool to regulate controversial matter because patents are not necessary to utilize or commercialize innovations.").
219 See supra Part I.C.
220 See supra Parts I.B, I.D.
221
See Margaret J. Lane, PatentingLife: Responses of Patent Offices in the U.S. and Abroad,
32 JURIMETRICS J. 89, 99 (1991) ("The continuing ethical and related considerations that
have now become significant issues overseas need to be addressed, but not in the narrow
context of patent offices ....
Patent offices exist to grant patents, not to set moral standards
for communities."); Schapira, supra note 39, at 172.
222 See supra Part I.B.1.
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of Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European Parliamentand Council of the
European Union addressed the concern that because "morality" is an
ambiguous term that lacks legal certainty, the Biotech Directive could
continue to place the European patent system at a competitive disadvantage. 223 The court addressed a related concern, responding to
criticism that the Biotech Directive will not achieve its goal of harmonizing the European patent laws. 224 Several scholars have noted the

validity of this argument because the definition of morality differs not
only between EU Member States but also among EPO courts that are
already applying differing standards. 225 Furthermore, EPO courts
have expressed reluctance to analyze the ethical implications of patents and have appealed to the legislature to clearly define the boundaries of patentability. 2 26 The problems that critics and the EPO courts
recognize with the European morality provisions illuminate the considerable risk in reviving the moral utility doctrine.
A.

Doubt, Uncertainty, and Disharmony

Lack of legal certainty and potentially disparate applications of
the moral utility doctrine may place the European patent system at a
relative disadvantage to the United States and Japan. Doubt and uncertainty are valuable in scientific research: "[T]o solve any problem
that has never been solved before, you have to leave the door to the
unknown ajar.... Otherwise .... you might not solve it."227 However,
doubt and uncertainty are of little value in the patenting process. The
European Union has recognized that the United States' clear patent
laws give it a competitive advantage over those in Europe: "The recent
USPTO guidelines have provided legal certainty by giving a clear definition of what can be considered a biotechnological invention and
what is eligible for patent protection, albeit not having touched upon
'ordre public' issues, in contrast to most other patent legislation in the
developed countries." 22 8 The effect of patent examiners' or courts'
moral considerations of inventions may churn up instability in biotechnology: where property rights are involved, reliance interests are
also involved. 2 29 As mentioned earlier, reliance interests in the pat223
Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council
35.
of the European Union, 2001 E.C.R. 1-7079, 2001 3 C.M.L.R.
224
See id. A98.
225
See Beyleveld et al., supra note 158, at 161-62; Gitter, supra note 94, at 4, 18, 21.
226
See Harvard/Onco-mouse, 1989 O.J. E.P.O. 451 (Examining Div.), reprinted in 1990
EUR. PAT. OFF. REP. 4, 11.
227
FEYNMAN, supra note 217, at 26-27.
228
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLICATIONS REPORT, supra note 126, at 37; see supra note 188
and accompanying text.
229
See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
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enting of biotechnology are strong because research in biotechnology
2 30
is a high-risk investment of extreme importance to the economy.

Lack of harmony within the patent system could also become
problematic for the United States. At first glance, the concerns regarding harmony within the EU seem to be inapposite. However,
there could be disharmony within American patent law as patent examiners and courts struggle with the vagueness of what constitutes an
immoral invention, while inventors struggle with the varied applica23 1
tion of morality standards by different patent examiners or courts.
Not only do moral standards change depending on location, but they
also change with time. 23

2

A patent examiner or court in the United

States will not know whether it is to determine an invention's moral
utility and, if so, whether it should consider the weight of public opinion, possibly outdated court precedent, or some other source of morality in conducting its determination. Furthermore, in applying the
moral utility doctrine, the PTO and courts must grapple with the procedural issues left unaddressed by the Biotech Directive and EPC,
such as whether the applicant must make a prima facie case that the
invention meets the standard for morality initially or whether the applicant must defend the morality of the invention only upon challenge. 23 3 Thus, the doubt, uncertainty and disharmony that could
result from reviving the moral utility doctrine raises a variety of
concerns.
B.

Possible Economic Effects

Reviving the moral utility doctrine in the United States may result
in several negative economic effects. First, implementing morality
standards may deter inventors from filing patents in controversial areas and initiate a chain reaction of negative effects. Deterred inventors may decrease research funding and diminish the growth in a
particular field of research, ultimately prohibiting inventors from creating alternative inventions that would be less controversial. 23 4 For
example, suppose an inventor wants to patent a transgenic mouse that
makes a particular protein of great value to cancer researchers. Suppose also that this mouse has a ghastly appearance, and after a scientific magazine features the mouse on the cover, animal rights activists
and those opposed to biotechnology in general cause an uproar. If a
patent examiner or court denies or invalidates this patent for being
immoral, the denial may negatively affect the grant and receipt of re230
231
232
233
234

See discussion supra Part I.A.
See Beyleveld et al., supra note 158, at 161-62.
See id.
See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text; Gitter, supra note 94, at 39.
See Strimpel, supra note 8, at 284.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:685

search funding for cancer and may subsequently diminish the growth
in this area of scientific research. As a result, inventors will be less
likely to create less controversial, beneficial research and inventions.
Second, since inventors need not seek patents for their inventions, they may keep their research private so the public will not scrutinize their work or benefit from its disclosure. 2 35 For example,
suppose that the PTO revives the moral utility doctrine. A scientist
knows that her purportedly immoral invention will be unpatentable
and, therefore, does not even seek a patent. Without disclosure of the
methods involved and the invention sought, the public, including legislators, will be unable to scrutinize the research and its potential effects and consider whether the invention should be made illegal.
Likewise, if this inventor chooses to patent this device and the PTO
invalidates it on moral grounds, the public cannot benefit from disclosure of the invention and subsequently cannot scrutinize her research
and its possible effects. The best result occurs when the PTO grants
or denies a patent independent of moral constraints. If the PTO
grants a patent for the controversial invention because it meets the
criteria for patentability, then the patent is disclosed to the public and
legislators. They may scrutinize the work and, if necessary, pursue legislative means to make such research or inventions illegal.
Third, introducing uncertainty and doubt into the United States'
patent law system may have international repercussions. International
investors prefer countries with "strong and effective" patent systemsnamely, the United States and Japan. 23 6 In enacting the Biotech Di-

rective, the EU recognized that strong patent laws would attract foreign investors. 23 7 Reviving the moral utility doctrine could spark a
decline in international investment within the United States. Of further concern is that weakening the United States' patent system may
result in "brain drain" because "inventors who know that the law of
other countries provides better patent protection than their own national law are tempted to transfer their research and inventive activities abroad, or to keep their inventions secret and avoid the patent
route altogether.

' 23 8

As noted earlier, the biotechnology industry

within the United States has provided a spark to the economy since its
inception. Because no industrialized country has succeeded in
favorable economic and technological development without a strong
research industry and patent system, 239 the United States cannot risk
235

Id.

236

F.K BEIER ET AL., BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PATENT PROTECTION: AN INTERNATIONAL RE-

VIEW 88 (1985).
237

238

239

See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
236, at 88.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
BEIER ET AL., supra note
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losing research scientists, and perhaps entire industries, due to increasing uncertainty within the patent system.
Fourth, if the PTO or courts act as "moral gatekeepers," this may
divest the legislature of its responsibility to enact laws to respond to
controversial inventions. If this happens, inventors who perform unpatentable research could still legally publish their methods and results, making them available to the public for "exploitation without
limit. ' 240 In sum, the possible economic effects within the United
States and abroad clearly demonstrate that courts and the PTO must
consider the potential economic impact of reviving the moral utility
24 1
doctrine.
C.

Concerns About Using Patent Law To Address Important
Policy Questions

Besides strictly economic concerns, courts and the PTO must address the value of reviving the moral utility doctrine in light of Supreme Court precedent and constitutional concerns. Like the EPO
courts, courts in the United States are becoming equally critical of
their ability to judge a patent's moral utility. In Juicy Wtip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained
that invoking the moral utility doctrine to invalidate patents may no
longer be good law. 2 42 The Juicy Whip court also cited Brenner v. Manson in noting that the "threshold of utility is not high" because inventions need only produce some identifiable benefit. 243 In Whistler Corp.
v. Autotronics Inc., the district court held that a patent designed for the
exclusive purpose of circumventing the law was useful. 244 The Whistler
Corp. court seriously questioned its ability to referee such matters,
holding that "[a] bsent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary,
this court cannot and should not substitute its own views in place of
'24 5
In
those of the PTO, the several legislatures, or the Congress.
light of constitutional concerns and Supreme Court precedent, courts
and the PTO must first consider whether moral and ethical constraints promote the progress of useful arts. 24 6 They must also determine whether the moral utility doctrine is consistent with the
Strimpel, supra note 8, at 284.
See Ho, supra note 94, at 283-85.
185 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
242
243
Id. at 1366 (citing Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966)).
14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1885, 1886 (N.D. Texas 1988).
244
Id.
245
See Ho, supra note 94, at 285. In the context of copyright law, Justice Holmes made
246
the corollary argument in Bleistein v. Donaldson LithiographingCo., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), that
those trained only in law are poorly equipped to judge the worth of pictorial illustrations.
See id. at 251-52.
240
241

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:685

Supreme Court's opinions in Brenner v. Manson2 47 and Diamond v.
2 48

Chakrabarty.
The Brenner Court noted that to be "useful" an invention must
benefit the public. 249 In contrast, the moral utility doctrine requires
the patent examiner to go beyond the inquiry of whether the invention can benefit the public to ask the normative question of whether
society should benefit from this invention. 2 50 This latter question requires the patent examiner to make moral and ethical determinations
beyond those recited by the Supreme Court's definition of utility in
Brenner.25 1 Furthermore, as scientists and engineers, patent examiners are inadequately equipped to determine whether a particular invention can benefit society. Their training and ability to determine
whether society should benefit from a particular invention is unknown, and the search for a consensus regarding the "ethical
'oughts"' arguably should occur in the legislature, where these issues
can receive wide attention and benefit from fruitful discussions
25 2
among interested parties.
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Court faced several arguments regarding the harm that genetic research in biotechnology will cause
and impliedly rejected the moral utility doctrine. 253 The petitioner in
Chakrabarty asked the Court to weigh the "potential hazards" in considering whether the invention is useful and, therefore, patentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.254 Thus, the petitioner asked the Court to use
a balancing test similar to a test that the EPO courts later developed in
247 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
248 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
249 See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534. The PTO's Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training
Materials do not mention "moral utility" but cite Brenner approvingly. See supra note 33, at
4, 35.
250 This argument is based on the distinction that Professor Feynman made in his series of lectures at the University of Washington. Feynman argued that the "big question" of
action is "Should I do this?" See FEYNMAN, supra note 217, at 44. He then divides this big
question into two separate questions: (1)"If I do this what will happen?" and (2)"Well, do
I want that to happen?" See id. Feynman argued that the question "If I do this what will
happen?" is one of science, id. at 44-45, and the question "(D]o I want that to happen?" is
one that requires moral judgments, id. at 45-46. Similarly, the Brenner Court apparently
envisioned the patent examiner asking whether a particular invention provides some identifiable benefit to the public. See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534. This is similar to Feyman's
science-based question: "If I do this what will happen?" To extend the utility inquiry to
include questions requiring moral judgments such as "Does society want this to happen?"
stands in stark contrast to the Brenner Court's notion of utility.
251
In contrast, the EPC requires patent examiners to ask whether society should benefit from a particular invention. European Patent Convention, supra note 61, at art. 53(a).
252
See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, RocKs OF AGES: SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE FULLNESS OF
LIFE 55 (1999). Gould makes a similar argument to Feynman by noting that science and
religion are "logically distinct and fully separate in styles of inquiry." Id. at 58-59.
253 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316-317 (1980).
254
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their Harvard Mouse decisions. 255 But the ChakrabartyCourt refused
to give any weight to the possible harm that the invention may cause,
noting that granting, denying or invalidating patents will not stop genetic research or "its attendant risks." 256 More importantly for the
sake of the moral utility doctrine, the Court noted that courts were
not the proper forum for such analyses regarding the balancing of
risks and benefits of controversial inventions:
[W]e are without competence to entertain these arguments-either
to brush them aside as fantasies generated by fear of the unknown,
or to act on them. The choice we are urged to make is a matter of
high policy for resolution within the legislative process after the
kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies
can provide and courts cannot. That process involves the balancing
of competing values and interests, which in our democratic system is
the business of elected representatives. Whatever their validity, the
contentions now pressed on us should be addressed to the political
branches of the Government, the Congress and the Executive, and
25 7
not to the courts.
Thus, the Chakrabarty Court failed to invalidate the patent, rejecting
the petitioner's argument that a "gruesome parade of horribles"
would occur as a result of patenting genetically engineered organisms. 2 58 As a result, the Supreme Court's holdings in Brenner and
Chakrabartyseem to contradict the moral utility doctrine.
In the face of contrasting concerns, the United States should
maintain its policy of separating ethical issues from patent law. Although the issues raised are extremely important, legislative bodiesnot patent examiners-should confront them:
If, because of overriding social or ethical questions such as concern
for the public safety, national security, or public morals, the policymaking bodies of our government conclude that it is not in the public interest to grant patents in an area of the useful arts, it is incumbent upon those bodies, as it has been in the past, to exclude
legislatively that technology from the scope of patent protection.
Congress clearly did so in 1946 and 1954 by excluding certain innovations in the field of atomic energy from the scope of the patent
laws.

2 59

255 Chakrabartywas decided several years before the "Harvard Mouse" got caught in the
EPO courts' "mousetrap." However, the petitioner advocated a balancing approach in
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 316-17, similar to that elicited by the Technical Board of Appeal in
the "Harvard Mouse" case. See Harvard/Onco-mouse, 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476 (Tech. Bd.
App.), reprinted in 1990 EUR. PAT. OFF. REP. 501, 513.
256 See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 317.
257
258

Id.

See id. at 316.
259 Brief of Amicus Curiae Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association at 19, Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (No. 79-136) (footnote omitted).
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The benefit of having a coexisting patent law system like the EPC is
that the United States PTO can learn from the European patent system's mistakes and achievements. Furthermore, we can anticipate
problems that would arise if the PTO were to revive the moral utility
doctrine.
CONCLUSION

Imagine an invention so repugnant that it makes everyone's skin
260
crawl, such as a process for creating a three-headed guard dog.
Suppose also that the inventor decides to patent this invention, and it
meets all the statutory requirements of patentability. Should a patent
examiner decide whether to consider morality in granting or denying
the patent? Criticism of the morality provisions of the Biotech Directive and the EPC indicates that the answer to whether or not such an
invention is patentable must be independent of morality.
This Note does not suggest that science should be immune from
ethical and moral judgments. However, the patent system should focus on whether society has a real-world use for a certain invention and
not whether society should use this invention. Biotechnology is an
important and rapidly growing sector of the world economy, and its
continued vitality depends on a strong and stable patent system. The
patent system should not become a theater forjudging the morality of
controversial inventions. The legislature can better address important
moral problems because patent examiners and courts lack the ability
to answer these difficult questions. Although patent examiners may
hesitate to determine the morality of an invention, they do not officially endorse granting intellectual property protection to controversial inventions. The PTO's duty is to examine whether an invention
meets the requirements for patentability (the "can society benefit"
question), while Congress's responsibility is to determine what is patentable (the "should society benefit" question). Laws outside the patent system-and not patent law itself-should shape national policy
regarding the morality of controversial inventions.

Arguably useful, but maybe not novel! See THOMAS BULFINCH, BULFINCH'S MYTHOL88 (1913); J. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER'S STONE 160-61 (1998).
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